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1. ABSTRACT 
Infrastructure networks do not exist in isolation. Rather they are interconnected to other 
infrastructures and, as technological development increases, so too does the linkage between 
networks. Interdependencies among Critical Infrastructure (CI) can cause cascading failures and hence 
amplify negative consequences due to these failures. This can also affect CI’s service restoration rate 
and consequently reducing their resilience in coping with these hazardous environmental events.  For 
example, failure of the water drain and sewer system due to 2002 Glasgow flooding affected many 
homes and closed many main roads and stations such as the A82 and A8 roads, Buchanan Street 
subway station and Dalmarnock through to Exhibition Centre stations on the Argyle Line. 
As infrastructures are becoming more interdependent at some sectors, there is an increasing demand 
for more effective management of these interactions and interdependencies. This paper provides 
details of a quantitative metric for the robustness, recoverability, rapidity and resourcefulness of the 
interdependent infrastructure network in response to hazardous event. By generating a quantitative 
measure of network resilience, considering infrastructure interdependencies, the most severe failure 
scenarios and their spatial impacts can be identified and mapped. This can lead to prioritise future 
business planning strategies for CI asset owners and managers. To illustrate the application of the 
proposed approach, a case study in North Argyll, Scotland is analysed and presented in this paper. 
2. Introduction 
The frequency and magnitude of environmental hazards in Scotland and UK in general, have 
significantly increased in the last decade, resulting in widespread failures in critical infrastructure (CI) 
networks. UK infrastructure networks are highly complex and interconnected. The centralised nature 
of these infrastructure networks and the interconnectedness between services implies that damage 
at a point in the system can have knock-on effects through the system and other connected 
infrastructure systems (Guthrie & Konaris, 2012). Therefore, it is vital that these systems to be resilient 
to any type of disturbances (McDaniels, et al., 2008). The pursuit for infrastructure resilience requires 
a pursuit for the reduction of failure probabilities, reduction of negative consequences when failure 
does occur, and reduction in recovery time (Walker, et al., 2004; Chang, 2009). The importance of 
protecting this infrastructure from threat lies not only in its critical role of sustaining societies, but also 
in its role of helping communities and the economy to rebuild themselves post-disruptions (shocks 
and stresses). Service disruptions caused by asset damage can lead to economic and societal impacts 
which, in the case of vulnerable groups, can be difficult to recover from. As a result, planning for 
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adaptation and mitigation strategies in CI networks requires a sound understanding of CI networks’ 
interconnections and their behaviour when interdependency-induced failures occur.  
The common challenge currently faced by asset owners and managers is the lack of a robust resilience-
informed business planning and management strategies in response to interdependent assets’ failures 
particularly in low-probability/high-impact events. To manage the infrastructure interdependencies 
and their interactions in response to disastrous events, in addition to holistic risk/vulnerability 
mitigation approach; there is a need for resilience-informed management system. This will establish 
the key components of existing CI network and will assess the sensitivity of these components to 
disastrous events and their capacity in coping with such events. This paper aims to show some 
achievements of the RV-DSS project in developing a resilience-informed decision making tool for the 
CI networks of Water, Transport, and Energy in a case study in Scotland, UK and provide a measure of 
interdependent networks’ resilience in response to hazardous events.  
3. Methodology 
An effective resilience-informed intervention plan, in an interdependent network of CIs, requires an 
integrated network model and an appropriate resilience quantification technique. Therefore, this 
section consists of a three-stage strategy:  
3.1. Stage 1: Interdependent Network Modelling 
Different approaches have been used for infrastructure interactions modelling, such as: empirical 
approaches, agent-based approaches, system dynamics-based approaches, economic theory-based 
approaches (input-output models), network-based approaches, and other approaches (Ouyang, 2014; 
Saidi et al., 2018). This study has adopted the network-based approach to model the CI 
interdependent network. For this purpose, the infrastructure network topology and layout features 
were characterized by taking advantage of closed-form expressions and numerical simulations. This 
method has been successfully and widely used to study the reliability of a power system under natural 
and man-made shocks (Wang and Rong, 2011; Winkler et al., 2011). To model the network, the assets’ 
attributes and the topological characteristics of each infrastructure network are needed.  
Topological network: it can be mathematically presented as a graph with nodes and edges 
representing their connectivity. For the infrastructure network 𝑀, network properties can be 
represented by 𝐼ெ = {𝑁ெ , 𝐸ெ , 𝑀ெ}: 
where, 𝑁ெ, is the node sets, 𝐸ெ, is edges set and 𝑀ெ is a 𝑁ெ × 𝑁ெ  matrix representing the 
mathematical function of edges to pair-wise nodes. 
An interdependent network model comprises of nodes (e.g., power plans, transformers, pump 
stations, tanks, junctions, bridges, etc.), links (e.g., distribution lines, information exchange, roads, 
pipes, etc.) and flows (e.g. energy, water, traffic, information, people, etc.) in a given infrastructure 
system. The actions and interactions of each individual infrastructure element (nodes and links) is 
modelled with a view to assess their effects on the system as a whole. It combines elements of game 
theory, complex systems and multi-agent system programming. 
Assets’ attributes: all the assets’ attributes (e.g. number of users per node, node/link type, failure 
travel time, node coordination, asset value, recovery time, etc.), in the interdependent network, are 
stored in a data repository, with characterisation of their physical and functional interdependencies. 
These information are then used to generate the asset inventory map and evaluation of resilience 
across the whole network. 
Figure 1a demonstrates an exemplar benchmark interdependent network created for preliminary 
study in this research.  
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Figure 1 – (a) Numerical benchmark network; (b) Failure propagation map 
3.2. Stage 2: Failure Propagation 
In an interdependent network of infrastructure, failure at an interdependent asset is propagated to 
all the interdependent assets, their services and the overall network performance. Assets failure 
(including the propagated failure in interdependent assets) can happen individually (single failure) 
across the whole network or concurrently (multiple failure – a schematic in Figure 1b). For simplicity, 
it was assumed all the multiple failures happen at the same time (no failure lag). The failure 
propagation times have been introduced as an asset attribute. This study assumes abrupt change in 
performance indicator, however, in practice this change could occur in linear or a nonlinear trend.  
3.3. Stage 3: Resilience Quantification 
The resilience assessment is meaningful if there is a recovery measure in place. Resilience is an 
endowed or enriched property of a system capable of effectively absorbing, adapting and rapidly 
recovering from the disruptive event (Francis and Bekera, 2014). Butler et al., (2016) defines 
resilience as “the degree to which the system minimises the level of service failure magnitude and 
duration over its design life when subject to exceptional conditions”. Hence, this study calculates 
resilience, given average recovery initiation time (𝑁்ೃ) and recovery duration (𝑁்ೃబ ) provided as an 
input/network attribute (see section 2.1). It also requires the average recovery cost which provides 
necessary metrics for a simple cost/benefit (resilience) assessment. To measure resilience a two-
dimensional metric has been used to reflect on time and performance indicator (i.e. network 
functionality) at the same time (Figure 2).  
  
Figure 2 – a) an example of resilience for normal condition; b) a network subjected to a failure 
scenario 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2, resilience is defined as the area covered by the performance indicator 
diagram. This area reflects network robustness, recoverability, rapidity and resourcefulness in one 
single metric. The performance indicator has been defined as the number of users remain in service. 
a b 
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4. Case study 
The case study hereafter referred to North Argyll in Scotland (Figure 3) consistent of an 
interdependent network of road system, railway system, ferry system, water system and energy 
system have been studies in this research. This study type requires a wide range of data. Given the 
variety of the organisations involved in data provision, the data sharing procedure proved to be very 
challenging and not achievable within the timeframe of the project. Therefore to illustrate the 
application of the framework, a dummy case study was produced using the open access data and 
shared with the project partners for further validation to make the feasibility study closest to practice. 
The dummy case study initiated with the assumption that water distribution network (in particular 
pipes) and energy transmission lines would naturally follow the transport network. 
 
Figure 3 - North Argyll - integrated dummy network 
5. Results and Analysis 
For the purpose of resilience evaluation across the whole network, the failure propagation (𝑁஺,ே௢,்ಷು), 
recovery initiation (𝑁஺,ே௢,்ೃೀ ) and recovery duration (𝑁஺,ே௢,்ೃ) are assumed constant for all assets 
(nodes and links). For the purpose of the analyses, these parameters are considered to be 𝑁஺,ே௢,்ಷು =
1ℎ𝑟, 𝑁஺,ே௢,்ೃೀ = 1ℎ𝑟 and 𝑁஺,ே௢,்ೃ = 4ℎ𝑟𝑠, respectively. Also, to demonstrate the impact of recovery 
duration change, the scenarios with 𝑁஺,ே௢,்ೃ = 3ℎ𝑟𝑠 have also been assumed to estimate and analyse 
the impact on savings given the unit cost of £100/𝑛𝑜. 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒. 
The impact of the optimised interventions have been assessed as the percentage of changes in 
resilience through a cost benefit analysis of the improved intervention. Figure 4 shows two exemplar 
results for a given 1 hour change in recovery duration (from 4 hours to 3 hours) in rail and water 
networks. This change in recovery can be in the form of improving the rapidity or increasing the 
resources available for the recovery process with the cost unit per hour (e.g., £2000 per hour). This 
cost then can be compared to resilient saving given the cost unit per 1% change in resilience. For the 
illustrative purposes, the unit cost saving per 1% change in resilient is considered to be £1000. For 
example, Figure 4 demonstrates the changes in resilience and the associated saving for all single 
failure scenarios in water and rail networks.   
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Figure 4 – Change in resilience and resulting saving for all single node failure scenarios and 1 hour 
difference in recovery duration a) rail network; b) water network 
It can be seen from Figure 4a that, given the level of interdependency between every rail asset and 
water and energy network, 1 hour change in recovery process offers the maximum resilience change 
of up to 5.5% and hence, resilience saving of £5,500. Similarly in Figure 4b, the 1 hour change in 
recovery process in water network has resulted in maximum of 3.162% change in resilience and £3,162 
of resilience saving.  
It is crucial for infrastructure asset owners to have a better understanding of the dynamics of their 
networks’ ‘interdependency zones’, their resilience levels and the impacts of the resilience changes 
across the integrated network. Drawing on this, Figure 5b illustrates network resilience versus 
maximum failure (i.e. maximum loss of users) for all double failure scenarios in all CI networks. These 
plots are divided into four zones: a red zone: high failure with high resilience; a green zone: low failure 
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with high resilience; and two amber zones: high failure with high resilience and low failure with low 
resilience. The thresholds used in defining these zones are subjective and highly dependent on 
decision-making criteria, for the purpose of this study, the midpoint in the plot is used as a threshold 
– this is slightly different for the rail network with significantly higher number of red zone failure 
scenarios.  
Figure 5a maps all the aforementioned interdependency zones in the case study as grey dots. The 
exemplar interdependency-induced double failure scenario shown in Figure 5a has been highlighted 
in red. As can be seen in Figure 5b, there are concerns in relation to double failures in Ferry and Rail 
networks (red zone) while water network mainly contains amber zone failure scenarios. The 
highlighted double failure in Figure 5a, doesn’t have much impact on road and energy networks as it 
falls in green area but it is quite concerning in ferry network as the maximum failure is high while 
resilience level is low (according to the user-defined thresholds). Water network is at the boundary of 
green and amber zones implying the vulnerability of water network to this interdependency-induced 
failure.  
 
 
Figure 5 – a) interdependency zones in Benchmark network; b) Impact matrix for Double Failure 
scenario 
6. Conclusions 
This study demonstrates the resilience quantification and assessment of three interdependent CI 
networks of water, transport and energy in a case study in Scotland, UK. It is shown that the inherent 
interdependency in the infrastructure network can increase vulnerability of the network in response 
to cascading failures. Failure to understand the dynamic behaviour of these interdependent networks 
will result in ineffective response and poor coordination for adaptation and mitigation to tackle the 
emerging challenges. The results show that although interdependencies increase system vulnerability, 
specially in highly interconnected networks, but on the other hand, planning for shared interventions, 
through resilience-informed planning, can create shared opportunities for faster recovery and shared 
benefits. This implies that enhanced CI interdependencies management requires collaboration and 
shared intervention amongst all the role plyers. Resilience-informed interdependency management 
can transform the investment strategies in CI sectors. 
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